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9.1 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis and nonperforming-loan problem eﬀectively ended
in 2005, after one decade since its onset. The Japanese government contin-
ued a policy of forbearance until October 2002, when the government re-
leased the aggressive ﬁnancial reform, the so-called Takenaka Plan, in or-
der to accelerate the disposal of nonperforming loans. The Takenaka Plan
was remarkable in that it was the ﬁrst reform in Japan that strongly re-
quested that banks improve bank governance.
Bank governance becomes eﬀective through market discipline and the
government’s supervision. Behind the release of the Takenaka Plan were
undercapitalized banks and the weak supervision to accommodate them.
The government continuously took a policy of forbearance that allowed
banks to keep ﬁnancing almost insolvent ﬁrms and to understate the
amount of nonperforming loans. Minimum capital requirements had been
formally introduced, but did not work eﬀectively. A number of papers
point out that the government allowed banks to engage in various ac-
counting discretions in meeting capital requirements, including Ito and
Sasaki (2002), Shrieves and Dahl (2003), Hosono and Sakuragawa (2003),
Peek and Rosengren (2005), and Skinner (2005). The stock market also
played little disciplinary role on bank governance.
What the government chose was to strengthen supervision to banks
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banks to accelerate the disposal of nonperforming loans and, hence, to im-
prove the transparency of ﬁnancial information. However, the perverse
link of the stock market with the banking sector made things complicated.
If investors thought the reform was too tough and reacted contagiously, it
would have been diﬃcult to implement the reform that requested banks
meet capital requirements because Japanese banks held substantial
amounts of equities so that they were vulnerable to declines in stock prices.
The policymakers came to understand strongly the necessity for the policy
coordination between the government and Bank of Japan (BOJ). In March
2003, the new governor of BOJ, Toshihiko Fukui, announced a package of
monetary policies to accommodate the Takenaka Plan, including the con-
tinuation of the ample supply of liquidity to banks and an increase in the
maximum amount of equity holdings that BOJ purchases from banks.
The purpose of this chapter is to study the market evaluation of the Tak-
enaka Plan, using event study methodology. We investigate several ﬁnan-
cial events that occurred in 2002 and 2003, including the release of the Tak-
enaka Plan, the announcement of the work schedule for implementing that
plan, the release of a package of monetary policies, and the failures of Res-
ona Bank and Ashikaga Bank. We hope to understand how market par-
ticipants perceived the implementation of the Takenaka Plan through
these events that will be closely related to the eﬀectiveness of supervision
to banks. For each of the events, we examine three questions. The ﬁrst
question is if the impact of each event on the stock market return is posi-
tive or negative to the banking sector as a whole. The second question is if
the impact on the stock market return, if it exists, is uniform across banks,
regardless of possible diﬀerences of the ﬁnancial condition of individual
banks. The third question is if the impact reﬂects more than pure contagion
across banks, and if market participants diﬀerentiate the riskiness of indi-
vidual banks by their ﬁnancial conditions. The answer to the third question
may uncover possible improvement of ﬁnancial supervision.
We believe that the estimation for the market reaction to each event that
occurred after the introduction of the Takenaka Plan contributes to evalu-
ating the ﬁnancial reform and bank governance in Japan. By estimating
several events sequentially, we can investigate how market participants
changed their expectation for the implementation of the ﬁnancial reform
over time. In addition, we can evaluate the role of the policy coordination
by comparing estimations between, before, and after the monetary policy.
Brewer et al. (2003), a paper that is closely related to ours, estimate how
the stock market prices ﬁnancial conditions of individual banks for the
failures of four commercial banks and two securities ﬁrms that occurred
for the period from 1995 to 1998. Their ﬁnding reports that to some extent
the stock market incorporates information on ﬁnancial conditions of indi-
vidual banks into prices although the ability of the Japanese stock market
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to the poor transparency of bank information. The methodology and some
of ﬁnancial variables used in the present analysis are common and compa-
rable to theirs.
A number of other papers have studied the eﬀectiveness of Japanese ﬁ-
nancial supervision using an approach of an event-study analysis. Peek
and Rosengren (2001) study the government reaction to Japan’s premium
problem that occurred from 1995 to 1998 and report that the announce-
ment by the government was not eﬀective in the reduction of the premium,
but capital injections to banks were eﬀective.1 Spiegel and Yamori (2003)
study the stock market response to two ﬁnancial regulatory reforms passed
in 1998, the Financial Reconstruction Act and the Rapid Recapitalization
Act, and report that shareholders of regional banks responded favorably
to the legislation of these acts, while those of large banks did adversely.
Spiegel and Yamori (2004) argue that market participants perceive the ﬁ-
nancial supervisory policy as a too-big-to-fail policy, but that the tendency
to favor large banks has been diminishing over time. Yamori and Koba-
yashi (2007) study the eﬀect of the nationalization of Resona Bank on the
stock market and report that as the government announces the protection
of shareholders of Resona, market participants come to regard the injec-
tion of public funds for the nationalization as a too-big-to-fail policy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 9.2 surveys the ﬁnancial su-
pervisory policy in Japan since 1998. Section 9.3 explains the methodology.
Section 9.4 explains data. Section 9.5 reports the empirical results. Section
9.6 examines other related events. Section 9.7 concludes.
9.2 Financial Supervisory Policy in Japan
In 1997, three large ﬁnancial institutions, Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido
Takushoku Bank, and Yamaichi Securities, failed, and Japanese ﬁnancial
supervision came to the turning point.2 In July 1998, the Financial Super-
visory Agency was founded as an independent agency of the ﬁscal author-
ity, which was reorganized in June 2000 as Financial Services Agency
(hereafter, FSA). In October 1998, two ﬁnancial reforms, the Financial Re-
construction Act and the Prompt Recapitalization Act, were passed. These
two acts were aimed to inject public funds into weak banks, to nationalize
failing banks, and to protect depositors. Soon after their enactment, two
major banks, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit
Bank, were nationalized for insolvency. Financial supervision was for-
mally arranged.
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1. Ito and Harada (2004), since 2001, credit derivative swaps as a good indicator of Japan-
ese bank risk.
2. See also Hoshi and Kashyap (2004), which is a good overview for the Japanese banking
problem.In March 1998 and March 1999, the government injected public funds
into large banks in an attempt to avoid a possible ﬁnancial crisis and its as-
sociated economic stagnation. As ﬁgure 9.1 illustrates, just after the legis-
lation of the Financial Reconstruction Act done in October 1998, the stock
market rapidly recovered. The stock market seems to have priced the de
facto establishment of ﬁnancial supervision favorably.
In January 1999, Mr. Yanagisawa was appointed as ﬁnancial supervi-
sory minister. However, Minister Yanagisawa was conservative in the dis-
posal of nonperforming loans and even opposed to the nationalization of
banks for the reason that Japanese banks were recovering. The FSA started
to inspect bank assets in order to promote the disposal of nonperforming
loans. The FSA made the ﬁrst-round special inspection from 2000 to 2001,
reporting that the total amount of nonperforming loans disclosed by indi-
vidual banks was 34 trillion and over, whereas the total amount made by
the FSA inspection was 47 trillion and over. The gap amounted to 13 tril-
lion yen. This observation suggests that even after the legislation of the two
acts for ﬁnancial reforms, the FSA did not evaluate bank assets accurately.
The government continued a policy of regulatory forbearance in helping
banks that were severely undercapitalized. In 1998, banks were allowed to
account for “deferred tax assets” as Tier 1 core capital. Deferred tax assets
are tax credits from past loses that banks expect to claim in the future. This
accounting treatment of deferred tax assets provided bank managers with
much discretion on its estimation that should be subjective. Skinner (2005)
reports that Japanese banks have used deferred tax assets to compensate
for declines in bank capital that arose from unrealized losses on the hold-
ings of stocks.
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Fig. 9.1 Changes in stock price index and Japan premiumSubordinated debt is allowed to account for as Tier 2 complementary
capital in the Japanese local rule of capital requirements. In Japan, subor-
dinated debt is, however, held mainly by insurance companies, while banks
hold a signiﬁcant amount of debt issued by insurance companies so that
banks and insurance companies are under the relationship of “double
gearing” (e.g., Fukao and the Tokyo Center for Economic Research
[TCER] 2003). Consequently, subordinated debt was used as a tool of
regulatory-capital arbitrage. Ito and Sasaki (2002) and Hosono and Saku-
ragawa (2002) report that banks with poor capital tended to issue more
subordinated debt in order to inﬂate their bank capital.
Fukao and TCER (2003) estimate the “true” bank capital by excluding
problematic capital from the regulatory capital and report that, as of
March 2002, the true capital ratio in the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS) standard amounted only to 1.36 percent even after including
public funds injected as bank capital. The stock market also seems to have
questioned the government’s ability to supervise banks. Spiegel and
Yamori (2003) report that market participants perceived the Financial Re-
construction Act as a tool of forbearance. These observations suggest that
in the period of 1998 to 2002, the FSA had poor ability to supervise banks.
Stock prices began to decline again in October 1999.
Bank of Japan continued monetary expansion in order to avoid further
decline in stock prices and the consequent ﬁnancial crisis. Despite the huge
amount of liquidity supply, however, stock prices continued to decline.
In October 2002, Minister Yanagisawa had to take responsibility for a
possible ﬁnancial crisis and was replaced by Heizo Takenaka. He released
the Financial Revitalization Program, the so-called, Takenaka Plan in or-
der to accelerate the disposal of nonperforming loans. Behind this policy
change was recognition that a continued policy of forbearance led to huge
amounts of bad loans and nonperforming loans and made the stagnation
severe and prolonged.
The regulatory forbearance in helping undercapitalized banks allowed
banks to roll over loans to nearly insolvent ﬁrms (e.g., Hosono and Sakura-
gawa 2002; Peek and Rosengren 2005; and others). The subsidized lending
led to credit misallocation from manufacturing ﬁrms with high productiv-
ity to nonmanufacturing ﬁrms with low productivity (e.g., Caballero,
Hoshi, and Kashyap 2003). The “evergreen” has been recognized to be one
important source of the slowdown of economic growth in the Japanese
economy.
At the end of November 2002, the government announced the detailed
work schedule for implementing the Takenaka Plan. The Takenaka Plan
had three main parts. First, the government requested banks to disclose 
the amount of nonperforming loans on a stricter standard than before.
Second, the government stopped a policy that allowed banks to engage in
regulatory-capital arbitrage for meeting minimum capital requirements.
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assets as bank capital. Third, the government arranged a scheme for in-
jecting public funds into weak but solvent banks by adopting the Deposit
Insurance Law, Article 102 that is intended to help banks in order to pre-
vent a possible ﬁnancial crisis.
The government appealed strongly for the implementation of the ﬁnan-
cial reform, but some observers have been disappointed with the an-
nounced work schedule. Before the release of work schedule, the tighter
schedule of assessment rules on deferred tax assets was expected but re-
mained unspeciﬁed. In addition, the detailed rule for applying Deposit In-
surance Law was expected but not settled. To the end of this year, stock
prices continued to decline.
In early 2003, the persistent decline in stock prices continued. The gov-
ernment came to fear a possible ﬁnancial crisis that might be triggered by
the decline in stock prices. Japanese banks were vulnerable to stock market
risk because they held substantial amounts of equities. The policymakers
came to understand strongly the necessity of strengthening policy coordi-
nation between the government and BOJ.
On March 25, 2003, the new governor of BOJ, Toshihiko Fukui, an-
nounced a package of new monetary policies. New policies had three main
parts: ﬁrst, BOJ continued the ample supply of liquidity to banks; second,
BOJ applied the Lombard-type lending facility to the oﬃcial discount rate
by suspending the restriction on the maximum number of days; and third,
BOJ extended the maximum amount of equity holdings that BOJ pur-
chases from banks from 2 trillion yen to 3 trillion yen.3 The third pillar is a
so-called nontraditional monetary policy that was intended to interrupt
the transmission of risk from the stock market to the banking sector.4 The
stock market got out of the bottom in March.
In May 2003, the failure of Resona, one of the Japanese largest banks,
was revealed. This failure was triggered by its auditors who did not agree
to the excessively estimated deferred tax assets, but requested the write-oﬀ
of part of these assets. The capital ratio on the BIS standard was reported
to be about 2 percent at the earnings report as of March 2003, below the
minimum requirement for ordinary domestic operation of 4 percent. An
immediate emergency meeting of the Government’s Financial Service
Management Council, headed by Prime Minister Koizumi, decided a sub-
sequent massive injection of public funds following the Deposit Insurance
Law, Article 102-1-1. The bankruptcy proceeding following Article 102-1-1
involves the injection of public funds and the restructuring by the govern-
ment initiative. This procedure is not followed by liquidation, unlike in the
322 Masaya Sakuragawa and Yoshitsugu Watanabe
3. Governor Fukui stated before the press that BOJ was ready for purchasing all the eq-
uities held by banks if the worst scenario came.
4. On November 29, 2002, BOJ implemented the ﬁrst-round purchase of equities from
banks.case of Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank. Article
102-1-1 is applied to a failing bank whose net asset is positive, but a pos-
sible negative net asset for Resona was revealed from the FSA inspection
done later.
Just two days following the announcement of nationalization, the gov-
ernment, fearing a possible decline in stock prices, announced protection
for the existing shareholders of Resona. Some observers criticized the gov-
ernment’s statement for the reason that this policy weakens market disci-
pline. Although the unclear government attitude led to much controversy,
stock prices apparently reversed the trend upward in May.
The FSA pursued Ashikaga Bank, one of the largest regional banks, and
disclosed the inappropriate loan classiﬁcation, the shortage of loan loss re-
serves, and the overstatement of diﬀered tax assets of that bank. The net as-
set of Ashikaga was reported to be negative in the earning report as of Sep-
tember 2003. Using this report, November 29, 2003, an immediate
emergency meeting of the Government’s Financial Service Management
Council decided on a subsequent injection of public funds following De-
posit Insurance Law, Article 102-1-3. The bankruptcy proceeding following
Article 102-1-3 involves the acquisition of all stocks at zero by the govern-
ment while protecting all deposits, the restructuring on the government ini-
tiative, and the sale of bank assets to other banks. Unlike the case of Res-
ona, shareholders bear the substantial costs. Stock prices kept the upward
trend.
From 2003 to 2004, the FSA conducted the third-round special inspec-
tion. The total amount of nonperforming loans disclosed by individual
banks was 34 trillion and over, while the total amount by the FSA inspec-
tion was 36 trillion and over, and the discrepancy reduced to 2 trillion yen.
This observation seems to reveal that the ﬁnancial supervision improved to
some extent.
By the introduction of the Takenaka Plan, the accuracy of evaluating
bank assets and the transparency of ﬁnancial conditions seems to have im-
proved, but the market reaction to each individual event varied. In the fol-
lowing, we examine the market response to the Takenaka Plan using an
event-study approach.
9.3 Methodology
In this section, we examine three important events that occurred in 2003,
the release of a package of monetary policies, and failures of Resona Bank
and Ashikaga Bank. For each of the three events, we examine three ques-
tions. The ﬁrst question is if the impact of each event on the stock price is
positive or negative to the whole banking sector. The second question is if
the impact on the stock market return, if it exists, is uniform across banks,
regardless of possible diﬀerences of ﬁnancial conditions or other charac-
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more than pure contagion, and if market participants diﬀerentiate the risk-
iness of individual banks by their ﬁnancial conditions.
The estimation basically takes the form:
(1) Rit    i    iRmt  ∑
1
k 0
 ikDk   εit,
where Ritis the stock return of bank ion day t;  iis the intercept coeﬃcient
for bank i; Rmt is the market index for day t;  i is the market risk coeﬃcient
for bank i; Dk is a binary variable that equals 1 if day t is equal to the event
day or window k ∈ [0,  1], zero otherwise;  ik is the event coeﬃcient for
bank i; and εit is a random error. Thus, the estimated parameters  ik cap-
ture any daily intercept shifts on event day (window) k and provide an es-
timate of abnormal (excess or unexpected) returns associated with the
event announcement on day (window) k.
Each of events occurred on the same day for all the banks. It is likely that
the abnormal returns are correlated contemporaneously among the indi-
vidual banks. Thus, we do not estimate each of individual equations inde-
pendently, but estimate equation (1) as a system of separate equations in
the sample using generalized least squares (GLS).5 To permit the variance
of the residuals to vary across banks, we apply seemingly unrelated regres-
sion (SUR).6
The values of the parameters in equation (1) are estimated using daily
data before and after each event date over an observation period suﬃciently
long to obtain meaningful results. However, because the three events that
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5. When the abnormal returns in the individual banks have contemporaneous correlation
with one another, there are two diﬀerent approaches: the ﬁrst is the “portfolio approach,” in
which the bank-level analysis can be applied to a portfolio into which the abnormal returns
are aggregated using event time. This approach has the advantage of allowing for cross-
correlation of the abnormal returns. The second is an application of a multivariate regression
model with dummy variables for the event date. Comparing the two approaches, the latter
methodology has the advantage of testing the null hypothesis that the event has no impact us-
ing individual bank data.
6. Because the events occurred on the same day for all the banks, it is likely that the resid-
uals in the individual bank equations are correlated contemporaneously. Thus, we adjust for
contemporaneous correlation. The methodology used in this article makes the standard as-
sumptions that the residuals are independent and identically distributed within each equation
and independent of the market return and the binary event variables; the noncontemporane-
ous correlation of residuals across banks is zero; and there is no event-induced heteroskedas-
ticity. Thus, the covariance matrix of the residuals in equation (8) has the following structure:
E(εε )    
,



















 n1Ioccurred in 2003 are reasonably close to one another, we have to be careful
to possible eﬀects of a speciﬁc event on the subsequent events. To avoid this
problem, following Brewer et al. (2003), equation (1) is modiﬁed so as to
permit a shift in both the intercept ( ) and the market index coeﬃcient ( )
after the ﬁrst event:




 ik,eDke   εit,
where e is the number representing each of events, the announcement of
new monetary policy (e   1), the failure of Resona (e   2), and the failure
of Ashikaga (e 3);  ik,eis the coeﬃcient for bank ifor the event e( 1,2,3);
and Pis a binary variable that is equal to 1 for the period after the ﬁrst event
window, the announcement of new monetary policy, and zero otherwise.
We ﬁrst assess the impact of each event on the stock market return as a
whole in the banking industry. In doing so, we test the following hypothe-
sis using the estimated coeﬃcients in equation (2).
(3) H0
mean: ( 1k,e    2k,e   ...    Nk,e)   0.
Equation (3) represents the hypothesis that the simple average of the indi-
vidual abnormal returns is zero. If market participants perceive the im-
pacts of each event favorably on the whole banking industry, the average
will be positive, while otherwise, it will be negative. Be careful that large
banks may have a great impact on the market price for the whole banking
industry. To take into account the possible impacts of large banks, we test
also the hypothesis with an asset-weighted coeﬃcient.
(4) H0
Wmean : v1 1k,e   v2 2k,e   ...   vN Nk,e   0,
where vi is the weight on bank i that is calculated by dividing the total mar-
ket value of bank i by the sum of total market values of all banks. Addi-
tionally, in order to compute the cross-sectional median of abnormal re-
turns, we test the hypothesis that the number of banks with positive
abnormal returns is greater than 50 percent in the sample:
(5) H0
median : median   0.
If market participants perceive the impacts of each event favorably, the me-
dian is expected to be positive, while otherwise, it is expected to be nega-
tive. For testing this hypothesis, we compute the t-test statistic and check
the sign test.
Second, we test the pure contagion hypothesis by assessing if the impact
of each of the events is equal across all banks. We examine the following hy-
pothesis
(6) H0
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ual abnormal returns in the sample are equal across banks. If shareholders
diﬀerentiate the riskiness of individual banks, the hypothesis is rejected,
while otherwise, the pure contagion hypothesis will be supported. For test-
ing this hypothesis, we compute the standard asymptotic  2 test statistic
and the F-statistic.
Third, given that the pure contagion hypothesis is rejected, we test if the
evidence of cross-sectional variation reﬂects their own ﬁnancial condi-
tions. In doing so, we expand equation (2) to include a number of condi-
tioning variables that reﬂect ﬁnancial characteristics of each bank and two
other control variables:
(7) Rit    i    iRmt    iP    iPRmt  ∑
e





 eDkeSHi  ∑
e
 eDkeTAi    it,
where    ke is the coeﬃcient for all banks for the event e (  1,2,3); CONDi is
a variable that describes the ﬁnancial condition of bank i at the time of the
event and is explained in detail in the following; TAi is the log of total as-
sets for bank i at the time of the event, and controls for bank size; and SHi
is a variable that measures the shareholding between banks and controls
for the exposure of bank i to the failed bank through equity holding.7 The
positive coeﬃcient of TAi may reveal the evidence of a too-big-to-fail pol-
icy. If the response of the stock market to the event reﬂects individual bank
conditions, the coeﬃcient of either CONDi or SHi is statistically diﬀerent
from zero. We test the following hypotheses:
(8) H0
cond: e   0,
and
(9) H0
SH: e   0,
for each of the three events and a number of measures of CONDi and SHi.
The coeﬃcient of SHi,  e, may reﬂect the government’s attitude toward the
existing shareholders of the failed bank. If shareholders bear substantial
costs in the event of bank failure, the coeﬃcient of SHiis expected to be sig-
niﬁcant and negative.
We investigate nine descriptive variables as representing ﬁnancial condi-
tions of banks: (1) the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans out-
standing (NPL); (2) the ratio of reported loan loss reserves to risk-
weighted regulatory capital (LLR); (3) the ratio of domestic loans to ﬁrms
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7. The variable SHi is deﬁned as SHi    iTAj/TAi, where  i is the percent of outstanding
shares of the failed institution j that was owned by bank i, TAj is the total assets of the failed
institution j, and TAi is the total assets of the surviving bank i.in the three industries of construction, real estate, and ﬁnance and insur-
ance, which are typically deemed to be riskier than other loans, to total do-
mestic loans (RISKY); (4) the ratio of bank capital to total bank assets cal-
culated based on either international or domestic standard (CAPITAL);
(5) the ratio of subordinated debt to risk-weighted regulatory capital
(SUB); (6) the ratio of deferred tax assets debt to risk-weighted regulatory
capital (DEF); (7) the ratio of liquid assets to total bank assets (LIQ); (8)
the ratio of the market value of stocks to total bank assets (STO), and (9)
the ratio of the latent gains (losses) of stocks to total bank assets (GAIN).
If the disclosure of nonperforming loans by banks is accurate, banks
with high values of NPL are then supposed to be ﬁnancially weak. The
marginal impact of each event is expected to be greater for banks with a
higher NPL, and the sign is expected to be positive ( 1   0) for the an-
nouncement of new monetary policy and negative ( 2   0,  3   0) for fail-
ures of banks. Loan loss reserves are, in principle, provisions for nonper-
forming loans so that banks that hold a higher number of nonperforming
loans should account for greater loan loss reserves and, thus, should be as-
sociated with a higher value of LLR. The expected signs are the same as
NPL so that  1   0,  2   0, and  3   0.
As we have discussed extensively in section 9.2, however, it has been
widely believed that nonperforming loans were understated. If the stock
market incorporated this information into pricing, the two variables, NPL
and LLR, may not appropriately reﬂect the soundness of banks. As a com-
plementary variable, we use RISKY. A number of works, including Hoshi
(2000), Sakuragawa (2002), and Hosono and Sakuragawa (2002), report
that banks helped many of nearly bankrupt ﬁrms in the three industries of
construction, real estate, and ﬁnance and insurance by rolling over loans
to them. Banks should account for loan loss reserves against loans ex-
tended to these almost bankrupt ﬁrms, but they could dress up their bal-
ance sheets by classifying these problem loans as good because the FSA
did not inspect nonperforming loans closely. For this reason, we use
RISKY as a proxy to potential nonperforming loans. Banks with a higher
value of RISKY tend to hold a higher number of nonperforming loans.
The expected signs are  1   0,  2   0, and  3   0.
We consider variables that capture the eﬀect of minimum capital re-
quirements. Banks with a smaller value of CAPITAL tend to be con-
strained more severely by capital requirements and will be aﬀected more
strongly by each of the events. The expected signs are  1   0,  2   0, and
 3   0.
As explained in section 9.2, the government implicitly allowed banks to
use subordinated debt and deferred tax assets as tools of regulatory-capital
arbitrage for meeting capital requirements. We use SUB and DEF as 
measures of regulatory-capital arbitrage in meeting capital requirements.
Banks with a higher value of SUB or DEF will be perceived as banks that
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Those banks will be aﬀected more strongly by each of the events. The ex-
pected signs for SUB and DEF are  1   0,  2   0, and  3   0.
The variable LIQ is expected to have a great impact at the event of the
package of new monetary policy. If shareholders think that the shortage of
liquidity is a serious banking problem, an announcement for monetary ex-
pansion should aﬀect stock prices favorably. Banks with a lower value of
LIQ are more likely to suﬀer from the liquidity shortage and will be aﬀected
more strongly by the monetary expansion. The expected sign is  1   0.
The variables STO and GAIN are expected to capture the inﬂuence of
the change in stock prices on banks. Purchasing stocks by BOJ is supposed
to weaken the adverse eﬀect of the stock market decline on banks. Banks
with a higher value of STO tend to be more vulnerable to the stock market
risk and will be aﬀected more favorably by this policy. The expected sign is
positive ( 1   0). Banks with greater losses of stock holding tend to be
more vulnerable to the stock market risk and will be aﬀected more favor-
ably by this policy. The expected sign is negative ( 1   0).
The stock price of banks that hold a greater proportion of the stock of
the failed bank is expected to decline more sharply. The coeﬃcients of SHi
are expected to be  2   0 and  3   0.
9.4 Data
Daily stock prices and returns for our sample of eighty publicly traded
and surviving banks are obtained from the Toyo Keizai Kabuka CD-ROM
for 307 business days from October 1, 2002 to December 30, 2003. All dates
are Japanese dates. Market returns are measured by the TOPIX index,
which includes seasoned shares of over 1,000 major companies including
both banks and nonbanks (First Section) traded on the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change, from the CD-ROM of the Toyo Keizai Inc.’s stock price database.
The data on the ﬁnancial condition of individual banks are obtained from
the Nikkei NEEDS ﬁnancial statement database.
For ﬁnancial data of individual banks, we use the earning reports re-
leased as of March 2003. The announcement dates of new monetary pol-
icy and the two failures are obtained through a search of the statement re-
leased by BOJ and a search of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun. Actually, BOJ
announced a package of new monetary policies on March 25, 2003. At this
stage, earning reports as of March 2003 were not yet released, but banks
usually released the prediction of their earning in the interim period. It will
be conceivable to think that market participants use this information in or-
der to form the expectation on the ﬁnancial condition of individual banks.
If each announcement is made during a trading day in Japan, that date
is used as the event day. If an announcement was made after the market was
closed or over the weekend, we use the next trading date as the event date.
328 Masaya Sakuragawa and Yoshitsugu WatanabeFollowing this criterion, we set the event days of the release of a package of
monetary policies as March 25, 2003, the failure of Resona Bank as May 19,
2003, and the failure of Ashikaga Bank as December 1, 2003.
The number of banks used in the analysis is eighty for which stock mar-
ket data is available, except for Resona and Ashikaga, both of which are ex-
cluded from the sample to avoid the survivorship bias. Note that in this
sample period, a number of large banks are established by merger. We ex-
clude Mitsui-Sumitomo Bank that is established by the merger of Sumit-
omo Bank and Sakura Bank for the reason that the stock market data is
available only after November 29, 2002.
9.5 Empirical Results
Table 9.1 reports estimation results on equations (3), (4), and (5). The
ﬁrst column in the table reports the result for the estimated abnormal re-
turns of individual banks for Day0 of each event window, the second col-
umn for Day 1, and the third column for the [0, 1] window.
For the new monetary policy, the ﬁrst row, denoted, “Simple Mean,” re-
ports the average of the individual abnormal returns, and beneath the ﬁrst
row reports t-values.8The average of abnormal stock market returns is pos-
itive and signiﬁcant for Day0, negative and insigniﬁcant for Day 1, and
positive and signiﬁcant for the [0, 1] window. The third row, denoted,
“Weighted Mean,” reports the asset-weighted average of the individual ab-
normal returns and reports t-values beneath the third. The abnormal re-
turns are positive and signiﬁcant for Day0, negative and signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level for Day 1, and positive and signiﬁcant for the [0, 1] win-
dow. The two alternative estimations both seem to show that market par-
ticipants perceive the monetary policy as favorable.
The row denoted “Median” reports the median of the abnormal returns
of individual banks. The row denoted “Positive” reports the number of
banks whose abnormal return is positive, and the row denoted “Negative”
reports the number of banks whose abnormal return is negative. The row
denoted “sign-test” reports z-values on the statistical signiﬁcance for the
median. On the event Day0, among eighty surviving banks, abnormal re-
turns are positive for sixty-two banks, and the median is positive and sig-
niﬁcant. On the event Day 1, the number of banks whose abnormal re-
turn is negative is more than a half (forty-six banks), and the median is
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8. On November 29, 2002, BOJ implemented the ﬁrst-round purchase of equities held by
banks. But we do not examine this event because there were some reasons to support that
some impacts of this policy were already incorporated into stock prices. For example, TOPIX
shot up 1.66 percent on news that BOJ ﬁrst announced the stock purchasing plan on Sep-
tember 18, 2002 and 3.32 percent on news that BOJ released “Stock Purchasing Guidelines”
in October 11, 2002. On the other hand, it moved up only 0.52 percent on November 29, 2002.
On the other hand, on the second-round purchase of equities, no information was leaked be-
forehand.negative but insigniﬁcant. On the two-day window, the median is positive
and signiﬁcant. The results for the three event days suggest that stock-
holders of banks evaluate new monetary policy favorably to the banking
industry.
The estimation of the failure of Resona Bank shows that the row denoted
“Simple Mean” reports that the average of the coeﬃcients on the abnormal
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Table 9.1 Abnormal returns of surviving banks
Day 0 Day  1 [0, 1]
New monetary policy (March 25, 2003)
Simple mean 0.011 –0.001 0.01
t-statistic 5.55∗∗∗ –0.51 4.09∗∗∗
Weighted mean 0.017 –0.004 0.006
t-statistic 2.62∗∗ –1.41∗ 2.37∗∗
Median 0.011 –0.002 0.011
Positive 62 34 60
Negative 18 46 20
Sign-test; z-statistic 5.45∗∗∗ –0.79 4.56∗∗∗
H0 :  1   ...      80
F-statistic 2.61∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗ 5.21∗∗∗
 2-statistic 208.92∗∗∗ 208.07∗∗∗ 416.51∗∗∗
Failure of Resona Bank (May 19, 2003)
Simple mean –0.011 –0.004 –0.015
t-statistic –5.95∗∗∗ –2.00∗∗ –5.10∗∗∗
Weighted mean –0.015 –0.006 –0.011
t-statistic 3.19∗∗∗ –1.46∗ –2.55∗∗
Median –0.008 –0.002 –0.008
Positive 16 32 20
Negative 64 48 60
Sign-test; z-statistic –5.82∗∗∗ –1.91∗ –5.27∗∗∗
H0 :  1   ...      80
F-statistic 1.35∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 3.16∗∗∗
 2-statistic 108.23∗∗ 141.50∗∗∗ 252.79∗∗∗
Failure of Ashikaga Bank (December 1, 2003)
Simple mean –0.013 0.008 –0.004
t-statistic –4.64∗∗∗ 3.91∗∗∗ –1.30∗
Weighted mean –0.019 –0.002 –0.011
t-statistic –2.16∗∗ –0.33 –1.56∗
Median –0.007 0.006 0.002
Positive 25 55 45
Negative 55 25 35
Sign-test; z-statistic –4.94∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 0.15
H0 :  1   ...      80
F-statistic 2.87∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ 4.81∗∗∗
 2-statistic 229.79∗∗∗ 151.75∗∗∗ 384.80∗∗∗
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.return is negative and signiﬁcant in any of the three windows. The results
on “Weighted Mean” also report that the average is negative and signiﬁ-
cant in any of the three. In more than half of the banks, abnormal returns
are negative, and the medians are negative and signiﬁcant in any of the
three windows. Market participants seem to incorporate new information
on Resona Bank negatively into stock prices.
On the other hand, for the failure of Ashikaga Bank, the row denoted
“Simple Mean” reports that the average of the individual abnormal returns
is negative and signiﬁcant for Day0, but positive and signiﬁcant for
Day 1. For the [0, 1] window, the estimated value is negative but slightly
signiﬁcant. The results on “Weighted Mean” report that the average is neg-
ative and signiﬁcant for Day0, and negative but insigniﬁcant for Day 1.
The results on the median report that the number of banks whose abnor-
mal return is negative is more than half on the window [0], but less than half
on the window [ 1].
In the case of Ashikaga, the average of the individual abnormal returns
is positive for Day 1. This ﬁnding is contrasted with the case of Resona in
which the average abnormal stock returns are negative for both Day0 and
Day 1. In addition, the stock price of more than half the number of banks
rises for Day 1. Market participants do not seem to perceive that the fail-
ure of Ashikaga transmits to other surviving banks. In other words, mar-
ket participants may have anticipated the rapid government response.
Table 9.1 reports estimation results on equation (6). Rows beneath 
“H0 :  1  ...      80   0” report the  2-statistic and F-statistic. In any of 
the events, the pure contagion hypothesis is rejected. For each of the events,
market participants seem to diﬀerentiate the riskiness of individual banks
by ﬁnancial condition and other characteristics.
We turn to the investigation for individual ﬁnancial conditions. The up-
per part of table 9.2 reports estimation results for the event of new mone-
tary policy. None of the ﬁnancial variables is signiﬁcant. Particularly, the
coeﬃcient of LIQ is expected to be signiﬁcant, but it is insigniﬁcant. Nei-
ther STO nor GAIN is signiﬁcant. Market participants perceive the mon-
etary package as favorable to the whole banking industry, but they do not
seem to regard it as a tool of diﬀerentiating banks by their conditions.
The central part of table 9.2 reports estimation results for the case of
Resona. Among variables of ﬁnancial conditions, RISKY, CAPITAL,
DEF, and GAIN are signiﬁcant. The statistical signiﬁcance of CAPITAL
and DEF will reveal that market participants came to perceive the Take-
naka Plan as an eﬀective tool to strengthen supervision. Particularly, the
negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of DEF will reﬂect the fact that the gov-
ernment did not allow Resona to overestimate diﬀered tax assets as bank
capital and ﬁnally nationalized Resona. Market participants seem to per-
ceive that banks with greater deferred tax assets will be more severely dis-
ciplined through a stricter standard of capital requirements.
Neither NPL nor LLR is signiﬁcant, while RISKY is signiﬁcant. Market


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.participants seem to perceive that nonperforming loans are still under-
stated. Indeed, the government nationalized Resona by following Deposit
Insurance Law, Article 102-1-1, which is intended to be applied to the bank
whose net asset is positive, but later the FSA inspection detected a possible
negative net asset of Resona. The measure of bank size, TA, is insigniﬁcant.
We do not ﬁnd any result to support for the too-big-to-fail policy.9 The
variable SH is insigniﬁcant in all of the estimations. This result may reﬂect
the fact that market participants accurately anticipated the protection of
the existing shareholders of Resona following nationalization.
The lower part of table 9.2 reports estimation results for the case of
Ashikaga. Among variables of ﬁnancial conditions, ﬁve variables, NPL,
LLR, CAPITAL, DEF, and SUB are signiﬁcant. In terms of variables on
nonperforming loans, NPL and LLR are signiﬁcant. On the other had,
RISKY is insigniﬁcant, while it is signiﬁcant in the case of Resona. Mar-
ket participants come to perceive that the FSA came to inspect nonper-
forming loans more accurately than before. In terms of variables on bank
capital, DEF and SUB are signiﬁcant. Market participants seem to per-
ceive that the FSA came to force banks to meet capital requirements in a
stricter standard. The variable SH is, unlike the case of Resona, negative
and signiﬁcant in all of the estimations. This result seems to reﬂect the fact
that the government adopts the bankruptcy proceeding under which the
existing shareholders bear the substantial costs. The variable TA is in-
signiﬁcant in all of the estimations.
Brewer et al. (2003) study a similar analysis using the failures of six ﬁ-
nancial institutions that occurred from 1995 to 1998, including Hyogo
Bank, Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Yamaichi Securities,
Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, and Nippon Credit Bank. Four compa-
rable variables of NPL, LLR, RISKY, and CAPITAL are used for their
analysis and ours. Limiting cases on their four bank failures, the propor-
tion of signiﬁcant coeﬃcients is about 31 percent (ﬁve among sixteen). On
the other hand, the percentage rises to 63 percent in the present analysis.
Market participants seem to perceive that the FSA supervision consider-
ably improved after the introduction of the Takenaka Plan.
9.6 Other Related Events
In this section, we examine three other related events. The ﬁrst event is
the release of the Takenaka Plan, the second the announcement of the
work schedule for implementing the Takenaka Plan, and the third is the an-
nouncement of the protection of existing shareholders of Resona Bank.
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9. We never deny other possible methodologies to verify the evidence of a too-big-to-fail
policy. For example, a nonlinear relationship between abnormal return and bank size might
uncover the presence of a too-big-to-fail protection.We ﬁrst examine the two events on the Takenaka Plan. We estimate
equations (2) through (9) using the event day of the release of the Takenaka
Plan as October 30, 2002, and the event day of the announcement of work
schedule for implementing the Takenaka Plan as November 28, 2002.10
Table 9.3reports the estimation results for equations (3), (4), and (5). For
the estimation of the release of the Takenaka Plan, the row denoted
“Simple Mean” reports that the average of the individual abnormal returns
is positive and signiﬁcant in any of the three windows. The results on
“Weighted Mean” also report that the average is positive and signiﬁcant
for Day1 and the [0, 1] windows. In more than half of the banks, abnor-
mal return is positive, and the median is positive and signiﬁcant in any of
the three windows. Market participants seem to perceive the release of the
Takenaka Plan as favorable.
On the other hand, for the announcement of schedule for implementing
the Takenaka Plan, the row denoted “Simple Mean” reports that the aver-
age of the individual abnormal returns is negative and signiﬁcant for Day0
and the [0, 1] window. The results on “Weighted Mean” also report that
the average is negative and signiﬁcant for Day0 and the [0, 1] window. The
results on the median report that the number of banks whose abnormal re-
turn is negative is more than half for Day0 and the [0, 1] window. Market
participants seem to be disappointed with the announced details of the
work schedule.
Table 9.3 reports estimation results for equation (6). Rows beneath 
“H0 :  1   ...      80   0” report the  2-statistic and F-statistic. In any of 
the events, the pure contagion hypothesis is rejected. For each of the events,
market participants seem to diﬀerentiate the inﬂuence of the Takenaka
Plan on individual banks by ﬁnancial conditions and other characteristics.
We turn to the investigation for individual ﬁnancial conditions. For the
event of the release of the Takenaka Plan, the upper part of table 9.4 re-
ports estimation results. The measure of bank size, TA, has positive and
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in any of the estimations. This result may support the
too-big-to-fail hypothesis. At ﬁrst, market participants seem to be afraid if
the ﬁnancial reform is appropriately implemented. Among variables of ﬁ-
nancial conditions, NPL is signiﬁcant but positive, contrasted sharply with
the estimations of the three events examined in the previous section. On the
release of the Takenaka Plan, market participants may have evaluated
banks with great nonperforming loans as “strong” banks by conjecturing
that strong banks can diﬀerentiate themselves from other banks by reveal-
ing the amount of nonperforming loans accurately. Behind this interpreta-
tion is that, as of 2002, it was widely believed that the number of nonper-
forming loans was understated.
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10. We use daily stock prices data over 246 business days from January 4, 2002 to Decem-
ber 30, 2002. On ﬁnancial data of individual banks, we use the earning reports released as of
March 2002.The lower part in table 9.4 reports estimation results for the event of 
the announcement of the work schedule. The variable TA is negative 
and insigniﬁcant. Among variables of ﬁnancial conditions, two variables,
CAPITAL and SUB, are signiﬁcant. Market participants seem to have an-
ticipated that the government took a ﬁrst step to prevent banks from en-
gaging in regulatory-capital arbitrage to meet minimum capital require-
ments. The variable DEF is insigniﬁcant. This result may reﬂect the fact
that the time table of tightening assessment rules on deferred tax assets was
still not speciﬁed. We have several comments from the comparison be-
tween the failure of Resona and the one of Ashikaga. First, market partic-
ipants perceive the Takenaka Plan as a too-big-to-fail policy only in the
ﬁrst event of the release of that plan. Second, the market perception to de-
ferred tax assets diﬀers quite a bit between events of 2002 and 2003. In the
two events that occurred in 2002, DEF is not signiﬁcant. As of 2002, mar-
ket participants do not seem to perceive that the government forces banks
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Table 9.3 Abnormal returns of banks for release of the Takenaka Plan and
announcement of work schedule
Day 0 Day  1 [0, 1]
Release of Takenaka Plan (October 30, 2002)
Simple mean 0.005 0.003 0.008
t-statistic 2.36∗∗ 1.64∗ 2.33∗∗
Weighted mean 0.010 0.019 0.015
t-statistic 1.00 1.76∗∗ 1.59∗
Median 0.002 0.001 0.002
Positive 50 43 50
Negative 30 37 30
Sign-test; z-statistic 1.86∗ 0.79 2.25∗∗
H0 :  1   ...      80
F-statistic 1.81∗∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗ 3.99∗∗∗
 2-statistic 145.08∗∗∗ 174.12∗∗∗ 319.20∗∗∗
Announcement of work schedule (November 28, 2002)
Simple mean –0.018 0.002 –0.016
t-statistic –13.04∗∗∗ 0.93 –6.46∗∗∗
Weighted mean –0.016 0.000 –0.008
t-statistic –5.00∗∗∗ 0.13 –3.16∗∗∗
Median –0.018 0.003 –0.013
Positive 5 49 16
Negative 75 31 66
Sign-test; z-statistic –7.37∗∗∗ 1.89∗ –5.92∗∗∗
H0 :  1   ...      80
F-statistic 1.88∗∗∗ 2.68∗∗∗ 4.76∗∗∗
 2-statistic 151.16∗∗∗ 214.46∗∗∗ 381.24∗∗∗
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.to stop regulatory-capital arbitrage using deferred tax assets. Third, the
market evaluation on the Takenaka Plan varied over time. Among ﬁnan-
cial conditions, the number of signiﬁcant coeﬃcients monotonically in-
creases over time, from zero (Release), to two (Work Schedule), further to
four (Resona), and ﬁnally to ﬁve (Ashikaga). Market participants seem to
change their expectation gradually on the implementation of the ﬁnancial
reform. Particularly, the credibility to the Takenaka Plan drastically in-
creases in the latter two. The turning point may be the failure of Resona in
which the government nationalized Resona by not allowing Resona to
overestimate diﬀered tax assets as bank capital. Another applicant may be
the monetary policy that played a role of guaranteeing the implementation
of the ﬁnancial reform.
We next turn to the Resona event. There is much controversy on the gov-
ernment’s statement for the protection of the existing shareholders follow-
ing nationalization. Some observers stress this statement as a revival of for-
bearance. Yamori and Kobayashi (2007) report that in their estimation for
the event day of May 21, 2003, the bank size has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
stock market return, and conclude that the government’s statement for the
protection of Resona shareholders seem to have induced market partici-
pants to perceive the nationalization as a too-big-to-fail policy.
We estimate equations (2) through (9) using May 21, 2003 as an event
day. If market participants perceive the nationalization of Resona as a too-
big-to-fail policy, the log of total assets, denoted TA, should have a posi-
tive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.
Table 9.5 reports estimation results for equation (3), (4), and (5). The
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Table 9.5 Abnormal returns of surviving banks for the statement for protection of
Resona shareholders
Day 0 Day  1 [0, 1]
The government announcement to protect shareholders of Resona (May 21, 2003)
Simple mean 0.011 0.007 0.009
t-statistic 1.43∗ 1.75∗∗ 1.68∗∗
Weighted mean –0.018 –0.001 –0.010
t-statistic –2.15∗∗ –0.27 –1.54∗∗
Median –0.004 0.002 –0.004
Positive 25 45 25
Negative 55 35 55
Sign-test; z-statistic –2.93∗∗ 2.24∗∗ –4.37∗∗∗
H0 :  1   ...      80
F-statistic 1.34∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ 3.41∗∗∗
 2-statistic 107.22∗∗ 165.34∗∗∗ 272.77∗∗∗
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.ﬁrst row, denoted “Simple Mean,” reports that the average of the individ-
ual abnormal returns is positive and signiﬁcant in any of the three win-
dows. On the contrary, the results on “Weighted Mean” report that the av-
erage is negative in any of the three windows and signiﬁcant for Day0 and
the [0, 1] window. This result may reveal that stock prices of small and re-
gional banks rose, but those of large banks declined. Market participants
do not perceive the statement for the protection of existing shareholders as
a too-big-to-fail policy.
Table 9.6reports the estimation results. The variable SUB is positive and
signiﬁcant, while it is insigniﬁcant in the estimation of May 19 to 20, 2003
(see table 9.2). Market participants seem to perceive the statement for pro-
tection as a revival of a forbearance policy. The variable SH is positive, and
the t-values of the coeﬃcient improve relative to the estimation of May 19
to 20, 2003. This result is contrasted with the case of Ashikaga in which SH
is negative and signiﬁcant. The contrasting result between the two will re-
ﬂect the diﬀerent attitude of the government toward bank shareholders.
The variable TA is insigniﬁcant in all of the estimations. We do not ﬁnd any
result to support the too-big-to-fail policy.
Our estimation diﬀers from Yamori and Kobayashi (2007) in three re-
spects. First, as a measure of bank size, they use a dummy variable that
takes unity if the total asset of a bank is larger than that of Resona and zero
otherwise, while we use the log of total assets. Second, they control for
three variables representing the ﬁnancial condition of banks, CAPITAL,
NPL, and DEF in our deﬁnition, while we use more variables including
SUB and RISKY. Third, we use the variable SH to control for the exposure
of a bank to the failed bank through equity holding.
9.7 Conclusion
Using event-study methodology, we study how the stock market evalu-
ates the Japanese ﬁnancial reform, the Takenaka Plan that started in Oc-
tober 2002. We investigate several ﬁnancial events that occurred in 2002
and 2003, including the release of the Takenaka Plan, the announcement
of the work schedule for implementing that plan, the release of a package
of monetary policies, and the failures of Resona Bank and Ashikaga Bank.
Market participants came to perceive gradually that the government ap-
propriately implements the Takenaka Plan in an attempt to improve bank
governance. The credibility of the reform seems to have increased after the
events that occurred in 2003, the failures of Resona and Ashikaga. In these
estimations, bank shareholders diﬀerentiate individual banks by their ﬁ-
nancial conditions. This suggests ﬁnancial supervision seems to have im-
proved to some extent. Monetary policy also played an important role. The
turning point may be the failure of Resona, in which the government
nationalized Resona by not allowing Resona to overestimate diﬀered tax






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.assets as bank capital. Another applicant may be the monetary policy that
played a role of guaranteeing the implementation of the ﬁnancial reform.
References
Brewer, E., III, and H. Genay, W. C. Hunter, and G. G. Kaufman. 2003. Does the
Japanese stock market price bank-risk? Evidence from ﬁnancial ﬁrm failures.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 35 (4): 507–43.
Caballero, R. J., T. Hoshi, and A. K. Kashyap. 2003. Zombie lending and depressed
restructuring in Japan. Paper presented at the NBER/CEPR/CIRJE/EIJS Japan
Project meeting, Tokyo, Japan.
Fukao, M., and TCER. 2003. Kennsyo Ginnko Kiki-Suuti ga Simesu Keiei Jittai
(Evidence of quantitative eﬀects of the banking crisis). Tokyo: Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun-sha.
Hoshi, T. 2000. Naze Nihon ha Ryuudousei no Wana kara Nogareraretanoka? (Why
didn’t Japan escape from the liquidity trap?). In Zero Kinri to Nihon Keizai, ed.
M. Fukao and H. Yoshikawa. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun-sha.
Hoshi, T., and A. K. Kashyap. 2004. Japan’s ﬁnancial crisis and economic stagna-
tion. Journal of Economic Perspective 18 (1): 3–26.
Hosono, K., and M. Sakuragawa. 2002. Soft budget problems in the Japanese
credit market. Nagoya City University, Discussion Paper.
Ito, T., and K. Harada. 2004. Credit derivative premium as a new Japan premium.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36 (5): 965–68.
Ito, T., and Y. N. Sasaki. 2002. Impacts of the Basel capital standard on Japanese
banks’ behavior. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies16:372–97.
Peek, J., and E. S. Rosengren. 2001. Determinants of the Japan premium: Actions
speak louder than words. Journal of International Economics 53:283–305.
———. 2005. Unnatural selection: Pervasive incentives and the misallocation of
credit in Japan. American Economic Review 95:1144–66.
Sakuragawa, M. 2002. Kinnyu Kiki no Keizai Bunseki (The economic analysis of the
ﬁnancial crisis). Tokyo: Daigaku Syuppannkai.
Shrieves, R. E., and D. Dahl. 2003. Discretionary accounting and the behavior of
Japanese banks under ﬁnancial duress. Journal of Banking and Finance27:1219–
43.
Skinner, D. J. 2005. The rise of deferred tax assets in Japan: The case of the major
Japanese banks. University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, Working
Paper.
Spiegel, M. M., and N. Yamori. 2003. The impact of Japan’s ﬁnancial stabilization
laws on bank equity values. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
17:263–82.
———. 2004. The evolution of bank resolution policies in Japan: Evidence from
market equity values. Journal of Financial Research 27 (1): 115–32.
Yamori, N., and A. Kobayashi. 2007. Wealth eﬀect of public fund injections to ail-
ing banks: Do deferred tax assets and auditing ﬁrms matter? Japanese Economic
Review 58 (4): 466–83.
340 Masaya Sakuragawa and Yoshitsugu Watanabe